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The Oil Import Question: Research, Report,
Reaction
N MARCH 1969, President Nixon appointed a seven member
cabinet level task force' to conduct a thorough review of manda-
tory oil import restrictions. Less than a year later, in February 1970,
the Task Force submitted a report which recommended "a substan-
tial change in both the method and direction of import controls." 2
Five of the seven members concurred generally in the suggested
revision of the program; the remaining two disagreed completely
and filed a separate report.3
This Note will explore the short history of the oil import pro-
gram, the features of the present program, the arguments and the
forces both for and against alterations in the program, the recom-
mendations of the Task Force, the oil industry's response to the Task
Force report, the President's reaction to his committee's recommenda-
tions, and Congressional response to the whole controversy.
I. HISTORY OF THE OIL IMPORT PROGRAM
During the early 1930s, the newly formed Independent Petroleum
Association of America and several oil producing states appealed to
the federal government for some restrictions on imports. As a re-
sult, the National Industrial Recovery Act Petroleum Code of 1933'
was passed, enabling the President to fix quotas on oil imports.5
The quota system lasted only until 1934, when the Supreme Court,
in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,6 declared this delegation of legisla-
1 The Secretary of Labor, George P. Schultz, was Chairman. Other members were:
Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Secretary of the Treasury David M. Kennedy,
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel, Secre-
tary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans and the Director of the Office of Emergency Pre-
paredness George A. Lincoln. *Also present were observers from the Department of
Justice, Bureau of Budget, Council of Economic Advisers Office of Science and Technol-
ogy, Office of the Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations and the Federal
Power Commission. THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION, A report on the Relationship of
Oil Imports to the National Security by the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control
(hereinafter cited as Task Force Report), February 1970, at iii.
2 Letter from Chairman Schultz to President Nixon, Feb. 2, 1970, in id. at ii.
a Secretary of Commerce Stans and Secretary of Interior Hickel were the dissenting
members. Id. at 341.
4 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 196.
5 Maynard, Oil Import Controls: A Critical Approach, 5 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 150,
151 (1969).
6 293 U.S. 388 (1934).
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tive power to be unconstitutional. Quotas on oil imports were not
again instituted until the present system came into being.
At the end of World War II, the Petroleum Industry War Coun-
cil proclaimed it in the public interest for the United States to re-
strict oil imports so that domestic oil production would not be affected
or diminished. 7  Two years later, a Senate committee investigating
petroleum resources concluded, in like vein, that steps should be
taken to guarantee sufficient oil supplies "for all eventualities."'
These steps would involve both increased exploration for new do-
mestic deposits and increased research in synthetic fuels to augment
existing supplies. In contrast, the Secretary of Defense, at about the
same time, was advocating an active governmental policy in favor
of considerable oil importation in order to meet continually expand-
ing military and civilian requirements.'
But the oil industry was showing signs of concern. In 1949, the
National Petroleum Council, the industry's advisory body to the
federal government, laid down principles, at the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, which stated that a healthy domestic oil
industry was the sine qua non of a nation secure. 10
In 1952, The Presidential Materials Policy Commission con-
cluded that domestic oil reserves would become progressively inad-
equate to meet security needs. The Commission recommended ex-
pansion of both domestic reserves and reserves in other producing
Western Hemisphere countries."
Two years later, President Eisenhower set up an Advisory Com-
mittee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy,'" which warned
that continued increases in imports of crude and residual oils threat-
ened the "'orderly industrial growth which assures the military and
7 Resolution of October 24, 1945, in C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT 315 (1970).
8 SPECIAL COMM. INVESTIGATING PETROLEUM RESOURCES, S. REP. No. 9, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1947), cited in C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 316.
9 SPECIAL COMM. ON PETROLEUM OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES,
80TH CONG., 2D SESS., HEARINGS ON PETROLEUM FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 133(1948), in Maynard, supra note 5, at 151.
10 Resolution of January 13, 1949, cited in C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note
7, at 315.
11 1 PRESIDENT'S MATERIALS POLICY COMMITTEE REPORT 109 (1952), in May-
nard, supra note 5, at 151.
12 This was also a cabinet level task force composed of the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization as Chairman and the heads of the Departments of State,
Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Commerce and Labor. C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 7, at 316.
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civilian supplies and reserves" essential to national security.13 Oil
companies were subsequently asked to voluntarily limit their oil
imports in complicance with the committee's admonitions.14
At the same time, Congress was acting to empower the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), when he "has reason
to believe that any article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security ...
to so advise the President. Should the President, after an investi-
gation into the facts, agree that a threat existed, he would have the
power to adjust imports accordingly.' 5
In 1957, the Director of the ODM advised the President of his
belief that crude oil was being imported in threatening quantities.
Eisenhower promptly established another cabinet level committee
to examine and advise on crude oil imports. This committee re-
ported, in summary, that "some reasonable balance between imports
and domestic production" should be maintained and that limiting
imports would achieve that balance.' The Voluntary Oil Import
Program, which resulted from the President's acceptance and imple-
mentation of his committee's recommendations, went into effect in
mid-1957. It continued until March 1959, when the present manda-
tory program was established by presidential proclamation.'
I. PRESENT MANDATORY OIL IMPORT PROGRAM
The Mandatory Oil Import Program (Oil Program) is the only
American restriction on imports justified solely on the basis that it
preserves national security by insuring adequate domestic petroleum
supplies in the event of war or other emergency.' It is administered
by the Oil Import Administration in the Department of Interior.' 9
The Oil Program seeks primarily to accomplish (1) the regula-
tion of imports through many separate quota restrictions, (2) the
13 Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources
Policy, February 26, 1955, in C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 317.
14 Id.
15 Trade Agreements Extension Act of June 21, 1955, ch. 169, § 7, 69 Star. 162,
166.
16 Report of Special Cabinet Comm. to Investigate Crude Oil Imports, in C. FULDA
& W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 318-19.
17 Proclamation No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-63 comp.), noted at 19 U.S.C. §
1862 (Supp. IV, 1969).
18 C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 306. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1862
(1965).
1' 32A C.F.R. ch. 10, § 2 (1970).
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allocation of those imports among domestic importers, and (3) the
administration of the program.2"
For purposes of administration, the United States is divided into
the five districts, plus Puerto Rico, which were used for petroleum
administration during World War II (see Appendix). Puerto Rico
is treated separately. The main distinction within Districts I-IV is
that residual fuel oil is exempted from control only in District ."1
Petroleum imports are classified, for purposes of the Oil Pro-
gram,22 as follows:
(1) Crude Oil
(2) Unfinished oils (i.e. those imported for further processing;
e.g. naphtha)
(3) Finished products (e.g. gasoline, No. 2 home heating oil,
jet fuel, lubricating oils and asphalt). These need no further proc-
essing and represent three per cent of total imports.
(4) Residual fuel oil to be used as fuel.2"
The Oil Import Administration does not encourage product im-
ports since this tends to favor foreign refiners. For the continental
United States, Alaska, and Hawaii, imports of finished products
are permitted as a function of previous imports by certain importers
during the last allocation period before the Oil Program was im-
posed. The total thus permitted is deducted from the overall quota.
Unfinished oils may be imported under a crude license - up to 15
per cent of the license in Districts I-IV and 25 per cent of the license
in District V. 4
By presidential order,2 5 overland imports from Canada and Mexi-
co were exempted. However, agreements between the United States
and each of those governments limit in practice the quantity of oil
admitted. 6
20 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 5 117.
21 This type of fuel is used to heat and power utilities, industries, apartment and
office buildings, schools, hospitals, and other institutions. Its cost is much less than
other oil products and it is used predominantly on the East Coast. Venezuela is the
principal supplier, but Libya's market share is increasing. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, 5 121d.
2 2 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 5 119b.
23 Id. 121d n.24.
241d. 5 119b.
25 Proclamation No. 3290 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 20 (1959-63 comp.), amending Pro-
clamation No. 3279 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-63 comp.), noted at 19 U.S.C. § 1862
(Supp. IV, 1969).
26 This has resulted in a bizarre drama, enacted every three minutes at the Mexican
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QUOTAS: The Oil Program recognizes two principal quota
levels:2 7 (1) overall crude-products quota"8 and (2) residual fuel oil
quota. These levels vary geographically.
(1) Crude-Products Quota - In District V (West Coast, Alaska,
Hawaii) the crude-products quota is the difference between esti-
mated annual demand and estimated United States and Canadian
supplies, either produced in or shipped into the District. Producers
in District V, thus, receive complete protection.2 9 In Districts I-IV,
the crude-products quota is set at 12.2 per cent of estimated produc-
tion in those Districts. Estimated Canadian overland oil is no longer
exempted but is now deducted from the 12.2 per cent quota. Both
Mexican and Canadian oil are voluntarily limited by inter-govern-
mental agreement.- Since the agreements provide no enforcement
mechanisms, and the Canadian shipments have exceeded the agreed
amounts, this arrangement has caused dissatisfaction among com-
peting domestic producersY0 The District I-IV quota is further re-
duced by the amount of finished product imports from Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands.8
(2) Residual Fuel Oil Quota - Residual fuel oil is much less
valuable than the products in the other oil import categories. Do-
mestic producers have reduced their residual fuel oil production since
World War II in favor of the higher priced gasoline and jet fuel.
Imports are controlled in Districts I-V on a historical basis, but
District I has had virtually no import limitations since 1966.82
ALLOCATIONS: In order to effectuate allocation of imports
among domestic refiners, import licenses (commonly called "quota
tickets") are issued for (1) crude and unfinished oils, (2) residual
fuel oil to be used as fuel, and (3) finished products8" as a percent-
border at Brownsville, Texas. Oil from Mexico reaches the Texas coast by tanker. It
is immediately placed in bond and transferred to trucks which re-enter Mexico and, on
a continuous, nearly non-stop circular road, re-enter the United States. It is then re-
leased from bond and treated as having entered "overland." The oil is then reloaded
on tankers bound for the East Coast.
This overland exemption, on the other hand, has not been extended to trans-Great
Lakes shipments of oil from Canada, or to shipments from Canada to Ketchikan, Alaska,
which are subject to a short rail car ferry crossing. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1,
120.
27 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 5 121.
28 "Overall crude-products" include crude oil, unfinished oil and finished oil.
29 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 5 121 a.
30d. 5 121b.
31 Id. 5 121c.
82 Id. 5 121d. In 1968 District I accounted for 99.6 per cent of all residual fuel
oil imported into the United States.
33 Id. 5 122.
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age of refinery inputs, subject to several exceptions: (a) Exempt
overland imports do not count as inputs for the allocation scheme.
Because quota tickets are denied to refiners for their Canadian in-
puts, domestic crude becomes more attractive than the "exempt oil";3'
(b) by means of a sliding scale, small refiners are allocated a larger
than prorata share of imports; (c) since December 1965, several oil
companies have been given larger import allocations and permission
to ship their products to the United States mainland. The purpose of
this generosity was to create employment in Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. These companies have privately negotiated contracts
with the Department of Interior;8" (d) petrochemical companies,
the only companies outside the refining industry receiving regular
allocations of crude and unfinished oils, are permitted a uniform
percentage of qualified petrochemical feedstock inputs."0 The
amount available for allocation among petrochemical companies is
negotiated between the companies and government officials.87
Allocation of finished products8" are made in proportion to the
import levels in 1957, minus a fraction.8" The authority of the
Oil Import Appeals Board in "hardship" cases has often been in-
voked recently by New England's independent home heating oil
sellers, complaining of inadequate supplies and increasing prices.4"
Allocation of residual fuel oil is effectively without controls in
District I. Generally, allocations in Districts I-V are set at 1957
import, levels, except that special permission has been granted to
non-refiners in District V to import low-sulfur residual fuel oil.4
There also exists in District V a "bonus crude program," which
84 Id. 123.
85Id. 123d. Phillips Petroleum Company and Commonwealth Oil Company
may import additional crude oil from Western Hemisphere countries and may ship
specified quantities of derived products from Puerto Rico into Districts I-IV above prior
permitted levels. Hess Oil Company has similar rights with respect to finished products
originating in the Virgin Islands. These shipments are not treated as exempt, rather
they are deducted from the crude-oil products quota. Proclamation No. 3693 § 3, 3
C.F.R. 153 (1964-65 comp.), amending Proclamation No. 3279 § 3(b)(2), 3 C.F.R.
11 (1959-63 comp.), noted at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. IV, 1969).
36 Proclamation No. 3693 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 153 (1964-65 comp.), amending Proclama-
tion No. 3279 § 3(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-63 comp.), noted at 19 U.S.C. § 1862
(Supp. IV, 1969).
8 7 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 123e.
58 "Finished products" is defined as one or more of a variety of petroleum products
which may be used without further processing except for mechanical blending; e.g.,
liquified gases, gasoline, jet fuel, naphtha, fuel oil, lubricating oil, asphalt, and natural
gas products. 32A C.F.R. ch. X, § 22(g) (1970).
89 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 5 124.
401d,
411d. 125(a).
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permits refiners to earn a bonus of one barrel of imported crude
oil for each barrel of low-sulfur residual fuel oil manufactured
to comply with local anti-pollution programs.42 ,
These are the broad outlines of the program as it exists today.
There are many additional requirements relating to administrative
control, surveillance, and changes in regulations, 43 but discussion of
them is not within the scope of this Note.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The positions of the various antagonists are fairly well defined.
Following is a summary of each of the arguments advanced.
Oil Program Proponents Argue:
(1) Oil is practically our only energy source for transportation.
Our national security depends on continued, adequate oil supplies.
Oil also furnishes over two-fifths of the nation's heating needs.
Since oil cannot be Stockpiled in significant quantities for reasons of
space and expense, any interruption in our supply from foreign
sources would result in commercial and industrial paralysis. The
sort of curtailment experienced during the Middle East crises in
1956 and again in 1967 could recur and for longer periods. There-
fore the United States should not become dependent on foreign
sources for such an essential commodity as oil.44
(2) Our domestic wells produce an average of 14 barrels per day
per well. Under free market conditions, they cannot compete with
some foreign wells (in the Middle East) which deliver 5,000-
10,000 barrels per day. If this foreign oil is allowed unrestricted
access to American markets, the result will eventually be the de-
moralization and destruction of the domestic industry. Another re-
sult will be the loss of incentive to explore for new reserves and to
increase domestic production.45
Oil Program Opponents Argue:
(1) The nation's security is best insured by conserving our re-
sources, not by depleting them. The only way to hoard oil is to shut
down the wells until the oil is wanted.46
(2) The Oil Program is pure protectionism achieved through
121d. 5 125(b).
431d. 55 128-30.
44 Maynard, supra note 5, at 153-54.
45 Id. at 154.
4 6 Johnson, A Legal Alternative to Instability in International Oil, 6 NAT'L RES.
J. 368, 370 (1966).
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the efforts of American oil producers. These producers, in actuality,
fear the competition of foreign oil, and are arguing "national secu-
rity" -to achieve the controls they seek. For example, in 1957, when
foreign oil was readily available, domestic production was reduced.
Texas wells were operating at a record low of twelve days per month.
It was then that domestic producers renewed their attacks on for-
eign imports, citing the 1956 crisis as an example of the unreliability
of foreign oil.47  In response, it was claimed that, during the 1956
crisis, independent American producers actually resisted govern-
ment requests for increased domestic production and instead forced
an increase in domestic crude prices which were passed on -to the
public.48
(3) Quotas have -a harmful effect on the economy. By limiting
availability, domestic consumers are forced to pay unnecessarily high
prices for gasoline and fuel oils. Since 1959 controls were im-
posed, domestic oil costs have continued to rise. In 1967-68 alone,
they rose by ten per cent. As a result, the United States consumers
pay (depending on who is estimating) from three to five billion
dollars per year as a direct result of the quota system.49
(4) These high prices are inflationary. The Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers has estimated that the potential inflationary effect of
oil and gasoline price rises in the northeastern United States as
"about one fourth as large as the ultimate dollar impact that would
have followed a five per cent general increase in steel prices."5
If these prices rose across the nation, the dollar amount would ap-
proach that of a five percent increase in steel prices. 5 In that case,
American consumers would be paying about $885 million per year
more than previously for gasoline and heating oil.5 2
(5) In economic terms, it is unwise to keep the glaringly inef-
ficient American wells in production under the quota umbrella.
They are high cost operations and the consumer ultimately pays in
higher prices.5
47 Maynard, supra note 5, at 155.
481d. at 155 & n.5 2 .
49 Id. at 155-56; Testimony by Professor Walter J. Mead, University of Santa Bar-
bara on THE ADVOCATES, NET channel 25 WVIZ, carried on March 30 & April 6,
1970 in Cleveland, Ohio.
50 Administration Watchdogs Bark at Oil Price Rises, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1968,
at 19.
51 Id. at 20.
52 Id. at 21.
53 Maynard, supra note 5, at 156-57.
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(6) The stifling of free trade and the collective benefits that
free trade brings create resentment among potential suppliers to the
United States. There is a possiblity that such a trade barrier as
this constitutes a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) ,54 to which the United States subscribes. While
the GATT specifically forbids quotas, it does allow exceptions for
national security.55 The United States has never been challenged on
the validity of her oil quota system.56
In arguing for the elimination of "all quotas or other quantita-
tive limits on imports," one expert said:
It is time and long since, to dismiss the ancient red herring of
comparative wage scales from tariff controversies. If our crude oil
is expensive in terms of world prices, it is not because of our
scales but because of the staggering inefficiency in extraction
methods which we continue to tolerate . .. and because of the im-
pact of monopolistic organization on the oil industry's structure
of cost and prices. The remedy for such waste is not more . . .
protection but improvements . . . under the goad of competition.57
IV. THE TASK FORCE REPORT
A. Recommendations of the Majority
In analyzing the national security reasons for the program, the
majority report focused on the anticipated effects of abandoning
or relaxing import controls.5 . Without controls, the domestic well-
head price could be expected to fall from $3.30 (February 1970,
domestic price) to $2.00 per barrel (February 1970, world price)."
The majority found no evidence which would lead them to predict
a substantial price rise in world oil markets up to 1980.6o  Without
controls, American consumers would save about $5 billion annually
now and in excess of $8 billion by 1980.61 Savings would approxi-
mate two thirds of these amounts if the domestic price fell to $2.50
per barrel and one quarter if the price were $3.00 per barrel.62
54 Oct. 30, 1947, 61, Stat. pt. 5 (1948), TI.A.S. No. 1700 (effective Jan. 1, 1948).
55Id. at art. XI, 61 Stat. A32 (temporary emergency export controls); art. XII, 61
Stat. A34 (safeguarding financial security); art. XXI, 61 Star. A63 (specific security
exemptions).
56 Maynard, supra note 5, at 157.
57 E. RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDusTRY 201 (1948).
58 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 55 406-20.
59 Id. 5 407.
60 Id. 406.
61 1d. 5 407.
62 Id.
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Without controls, Texas and Louisiana "market demand pro-
rationing," which determines how much oil can be taken from wells,
would become "pointless." This would mean that over a million
barrels per day of domestic capacity would become usable over a two
year period, thus offsetting the 500,000 barrels per day from expen-
sive, inefficient stripper wells which would be lost. At a $2.50 per
barrel price, about half of these stripper wells would be abandoned. 3
With respect to long term production and exploration, at world
prices ($2.00 per barrel) the total United States reserves (including
Alaskan reserves) would show slight declines. Exclusive of Alaska,
additions to reserves could be expected to diminish to less than half
the present rate by 1976. At a domestic price of $2.50 the total
United States reserves in 1980 would approximate present levels. 4
Some jobs would be lost as a result of the phasing out of ineffi-
cient production. The loss, however, would be trivial when the
economy is viewed as a whole. Total employment in gas and oil
production in the United States is less than 300,000. An estimated
7,000 jobs per year would disappear if oil prices dropped to $2.50
per barrel. This matches the 1957-67 job decline rate the oil in-
dustry has experienced anyway. Thus, with investment and em-
ployment as mobile as they are, the national economy would not
experience severe adverse effects.6 5
The short run impact on our balance of payments would also
be minimal; however, it would become significant after 1975.66
Even at the February 1970 domestic rate ($3.30 per barrel) im-
ports must increase due to increased demand. At a $2.50 price,
estimates indicate that imports would be more than 40 per cent of
United States demand by 1980. However, all these additional im-
ports could come from Western Hemisphere sources if such course
were desirable."
In considering regional hostilities in or affecting oil producing
countries and resulting in a significant interruption of oil flow to the
United States, the Task Force rejected as unlikely the possibility
that conflagrations would occur simultaneously in all the oil export-
63 Id. 1 408. "Stripper wells" are oil wells which have fallen off in production to as
little as two barrels per day. What 30-Cent Crude Price Cut Would Do to United
States Oil, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 26, 1970, at 81, 82. See infra note 64.
6 4 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, 5 409.
651d. 5 410.
66Id. 411. For a detailed analysis see Appendix A of TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 267-98.
67 Id. g 412.
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ing nations. Even given hostile regimes in all the Middle Eastern
and North African oil producing countries, the likelihood that all
of them would be willing to forego revenues over a long period of
time is remote, if not non-existent. The Task Force does recognize,
however, in view of the volatility of the political situation in that
part of the world, that a Middle Eastern boycott of all major (not
just United States) markets, while "difficult to sustain for a pro-
longed period, it is ... the possibility most productive of concern. ' 68
The pivotal question considered by the Task Force was whether
import controls are an effective protection against interruption in
supply.69 They conclude that even abandonment of all import con-
trols would affect United States and free world supplies only mini-
mally by 1975.70 The Task Force recognized that there was legiti-
mate disagreement over the possibility of widespread interruption in
oil supply. 71 Their estimates showed that a "one year supply crisis
in 1980 would leave about 21 per cent of the United States and Cana-
dian demand unmet if North America received no Eastern Hemi-
sphere or Latin American oil. ' 72  Although granting complete inter-
ruption of oil supplies to the United States a minute chance of.
realization, the Task Force nonetheless refused to state that "'com-
plete abandonment of import controls at this time would be con-
sistent with the national security. 78
The Task Force did agree, however, that national security would
be sufficiently protected by revising the present program and im-
mediately instituting a modest reduction in import restraints.74  They
also agreed on the need for further liberalization, but would make
it dependent upon future clarification of the new Alaskan and Cana-
dian reserves.75  The liberalization approved by the majority would
replace the quota system with a tariff to be progressively reduced
68 Id. 9 415.
69 The effect of the interruption of oil supplies to the United States and the free
world for short and long periods of time is explored in detail in Part II of the Task
Force Report. The problem is examined in terms of: (1) projected oil markets for
1975-1980; (2) cost of restrictions as opposed to benefits anticipated; (3) general and
particular war contingencies; and (4) pre- and post-crisis responses to interruptions.
Id. ,5 201-53.
70 d. 5 250.
71 Id. 5 423.
72 Id. 424(1).
73 1d.
74 Id. 424.
75 Id, 424(5).
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and to be accompanied by a full review of the whole picture no
later than 1975.76The Task Force Chairman emphasized the planning aspects of
any transition schedule with flexibility to make alterations as realities
dictate. 7
B. The Minority Dissent
Two members of the Task Force, the Secretaries of Interior and
Commerce, joined by the Chairman of the Federal Power Commis-
sion as observer, filed a separate report.7 8 In it they detailed the
kinds of changes they would make in the present program - for
even the minority recognized that the Oil Program could be im-
proved.
Their fundamental disagreement with the majority report re-
volved around their views that: the present program, in general, is a
sound one;79 the majority report is based on assumption rather than
record;"° the economic results of the majority's proposals were not
adequately explored; 8 ' the majority exaggerated the cost of the pres-
ent program to the consumer; 82 the balance of payments would be-
come increasingly adverse if the majority's recommendations were
implemented; 83 the majority's criticism of state prorationing systems
is inappropriate;8 4 and implementation of the majority's suggestions
would retard the growth of domestic fuel industries.8" These criti-
cisms were wrapped in the familiar theme that a quota, not a tariff,
would protect the national security - as it has done these past ten
years.
The changes advocated by the dissenters were aimed at gradual
76 Id. 5 425. The Task Force recommended an initial tariff of $1.45 per barrel;
this is $1.35 per barrel above existing tariff levels. This would produce a price in the
United States of $3.00 per barrel, $.30 below the February 1970 domestic price. Spe-
cific preferences in the form of lower tariffs would be granted to Canada and Latin
America. Privileges not related to national security would be phased out. E.g., pref-
erences for small refiners, preferences for historical importers, and preferences for cer-
tain Puerto Rican companies. Id. 5 428, 343 & Tables O & P.
77id. 5 4 2 5(a)( 4 ).
78 Id. at 341.
79 Id. at 353-54.
Sld. at 355-56.
81Id. at 356.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 357-58.
84 Id. at 356-57. The Minority view was that the ultimate regulatory responsibility
is properly a matter for Congress, not the Executive branch. Id. at 357.
851d. at 358.
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elimination of the historical and company preferences, a slow in-
crease in the present quota on a year-by-year basis, an increase in al-
lotments to petrochemical producers, unrestricted entry of residual
fuel oil into District I, encouragement of domestic production of
low-sulfur residual fuel oil, and encouragement of imports from
Western Hemisphere producers due to their greater security of
supply.86
V. RESPONSE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY
The oil industry sounded the tocsin in an article in the Oil & Gas
Journal three months before the Task Force Report was completed.87
In anticipation of a recommended change to a tariff system, Walter
Levy, a well-known oil consultant, was cited as warning of a pos-
sible resultant increase in world crude prices. Only if a tariff were
not preferentially applied to Canadian and Latin American sources
would the oil producing countries not be tempted to raise prices.
A change in -tariffs would, he maintained, create an administrative
nightmare. The uncertainty of a preferential tariff system would
immediately affect the confidence of investors adversely. They
would be reluctant to commit funds for exploration when returns
were dependent on crude prices and profits over a protracted period.
He cited the harmful balance of payments on oil importing coun-
tries and raised the hobgoblin of another $3 billions per year flowing
to unfriendly and aggressive Middle Eastern countries.88
The beneficial effect on the consumer was claimed to be minimal
under a tariff system with moneys going from refiners to the govern-
ment. The government would, the industry claimed, be brought into
the business of influencing oil prices, oil investments, and oil pro-
duction, both foreign and domestic.89
In a subsequent article, the industry predicted "disastrous long-
range consequences" with only a $.30 cut in the price of crude oil.9
A $.30 decrease would destroy small independent producers and en-
hance the major companies. It would make thousands of stripper
wells, as well as more sophisticated recovery projects, 9 ' uneconomic
86.d at 358-59.
87 Tariff Might Jar World Price Structure, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 19, 1970, at 24.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 What 30-Cent Crude Price Cut Would Do to United States Oil, OIL & GAS J.,
Jan. 26, 1970, at 81.
91 One of the more exotic oil recovery methods is thermal recovery. The method
is effected by injecting live steam or hot water into the well, or ignition of the subsur-
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and "[c]ripple domestic production . 9...2 In five major oil states
(Texas, Louisiana, California, Oklahoma, and Kansas) about
230,000 such wells would have to be plugged. 3 A $.30 cut would
reduce exploration by as much as 50 per cent and would depress a
significant segment of the economy which depends on the contin-
uation of the entire petroleum industry (e.g., supply companies,
contractors, and banks as well as local, state, and federal treasuries).
The industry argument concluded that "[mlost oilmen express utter
disbelief that the White House would seriously consider [the Task
Force recommendation], much less adopt it. As we shall see,
the oilmen were right. There was no need to fear the White House.
VI. REACTION TO THE REPORT
Since the Task Force's progress had been carefully followed, the
majority report came as no surprise to most interested parties -
but the reaction of the White House did.
The report was submitted to the President on February 9, 1970.05
Less than two weeks later the President responded to his own cabi-
net level advisors by rejecting the essence of their cautious recom-
mendations and embracing the viewpoint of the minority and the
oil industry 6 - the "same sector of the economy that had originally
proposed" that a study group be set up. 7  The President also re-
acted by issuing a proclamation98 setting a fixed quota on oil from
Canada to replace the oft exceeded voluntary controls.99 He justi-
fied the new quota on the basis of "national security."' 00
face area. This improves liquidity and allows increased recovery from marginal sources.
The high expense of such an operation, and a concomitant price cut, would cause, in
the opinion of one consultant, an immediate shutdown of 25 per cent of all such work.
Id. at 84.
92 Id. at 81.
03 Id. at 81-84. This represents, by industry figures, a daily production of 1.3
million barrels per day. Stripper wells (there are 367,205 in the United States), owned
mostly by independent operators, are marginal or nearly so. The estimated "average
cost of producing and maintaining a shallow stripper is $3.25 per day." Operators can
make a profit at present prices if the well delivers 2 barrels per day. Stripper operators
are netting "from 25-50c per barrel now." A "30c cut would wipe out profits." In
California, over half the wells (22,000) produce less than 10 barrels per day and have
profit margins of 30-35c per barrel. These would have to be closed off.
94 Id. at 86.
95 N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1970, at 47, col. 1.
96 N.Y. Times (editorial), Feb. 24,1970 at 42, col. 2.
97 Testimony of Senator Edward W. Brooke (R. Mass.) before Senate Small Busi-
ness Subcommittee, Apr. 7, 1970, in N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1970, at 61, col. 1.
98 Proclamation No. 3969, 35 Fed. Reg. 4321 (1970), amending Proclamation No.
3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-63 comp.), noted at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. IV, 1969).
99 N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1970, at 61, col. 3.
100 N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1970, at 61, col. 3.
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The President also proposed another study, this time to investi-
gate the feasibility of an integrated North American energy market
- a feature upon which all members of the Task Force seemed 'to
agree. 101
The oil industry, not prone to public comment, reacted "almost
joyously" to the President's actions.02 Occidental Petroleum, an
American company, was an exception. It had applied in 1968 to
build a 300,000 barrel per day refinery in Maine, to be run on for-
eign oil. Occidental would need an allocation for importation of
that oil. In view of the principles underlying the White House
action, approval of their application seems unlikely.' This pro-
duction would have significantly reduced heating fuel prices to home
consumers in New England. 4
Critics saw the Presidential response as a victory for an industry
which, by forcing high consumer prices, is increasing inflation under
a banner reading National Security and National Economic Health.
One editorial, late in February, concluded bitterly:
The President seems determined to file and forget the majority
report. Those concerned about the public interest will be well
advised not to let that happen for, aside from its policy recom-
mendations, the report should become a classic in exposing the
costs to the nation of a system of extreme protectionism .in the
guise of defending national security.
Commendable as it is that the report could be made at all, the
summary rejection by the President of its basic recommendation
that the oil quota system be ended tells much about the politics
of oil and the real sources of influence in this Administration.'"
The story does not end, however, with the President's shelving
of his Task Force's recommendations. Early in June, 1970, Venez-
uelan President Rafael Caldera paid a state visit to Washington.
Foremost among the topics discussed was the 30 per cent decline in
Venezuelan petroleum imported into the United States in the last
ten years, a decline the Venezuelans attribute to the present import
101 N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1970, at 47, col. 3.
102 N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1970, at 47, col. 1.
1oa Id. col. 4.
104 Id.
105 N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1970, at 36, col. 1. The oil industry has a powerful lobby
which maintains over 60 offices in the Washington D.C., area alone, according to Martin
Lobel, attorney, on THE ADvocATEs, supra note 49. For an illuminating account of
the politics of oil, see Knoll, The Oil Lobby Is Not Depleted, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1970,
§ 4 (Magazine), at 26. Cf. testimony of Barry Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
before the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee Hearing on oil import controls.
He said: "Analysis clearly indicated a relaxation in oil import controls over a time,
coupled with appropriate Western Hemisphere preferences ... would satisfactorily pro-
tect security of supply." N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1970, at 57, col. 4.
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controls. 10 Shortly thereafter, President Nixon announced that the
United States would increase its imports of Venezuelan oil during
the remainder of 1970."0' Caldera had complained that Canadian
oil was receiving preferential treatment in American markets at
Venezuela's expense. The Canadians, however, had their own
problems with American import policy. Until March 1, 1970, Cana-
dian oil imports were theoretically limited by voluntary agreement
to 332,000 barrels per day. Actually, much more than that was
being transferred into the United States - over 500,000 barrels
per day by early 1970.108 In March, the President by proclamation
increased the official Canadian quota to 395,000 barrels per day.'09
This level was then strictly enforced, resulting in an actual decrease
in the amount of Canadian oil permitted into the United States. 10
It appears incredible that the national security argument and its
corollary, the undependability of foreign oil supplies, can be seri-
ously entertained when Canadian, Venezuelan, or Mexican oil im-
ports are being considered.
By July 1970, it appeared that the proponents of the theory
that the Middle East was an undependable source of oil had not
been completely wrong."' The Libyan government reduced its
production by 15 per cent, representing a reduction in production
of 500,000 barrels per day." 2 On May 3, 1970, the Trans-Arabian
pipeline in Syria was rendered inoperative by an errant bulldozer.
The Syrian government prevented its repair and another 500,000
barrels per day was kept from reaching the United States via the
Mediterranean."' In order to keep oil coming to American users,
increased quantities were imported from the Persian Gulf and trans-
ported around South Africa. This increased tanker requirements by
a factor of six to eight times and caused a rise in charter rates
of 50 per cent over those in effect during the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War. 4 As a result, Persian Gulf oil, landed in the United States,
cost $4.50 per barrel at the end of August 1970, compared with
106 N.Y. Times, June 3, 1970, at 2, col. 4.
107 N.Y. Times, June 18, 1970, at 22, col. 3.
108 N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1970, at 61, col. 3.
109 Id.
110 N.Y. Times, June 18, 1970, at 22, col. 5.
Il' N.Y. Times, July 26, 1970, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
112 N.Y. Times, July 26, 1970, § 3, at 13, col. 1.
113 Id.; N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1970, § 4, at 3, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1970, at
61, col. 2.
114Id.
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$3.75 per barrel for Louisiana crude delivered to the East Coast.115
In response to this need, both Texas and Louisiana decided to step
up their production." 6
By the end of July, Congress had begun to respond to the con-
fusion in this area. On July 28, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee voted 17 to 7 to include in a trade bill a provision freezing
the oil import quota system into law." 7 The Committee approved
the trade bill two weeks later. It was subsequently passed by the
House of Representatives."' The House version contained the pro-
vision barring the President from shifting to any system of tariffs,
thus putting the stamp of legislative approval upon the quota ap-
proach."' The Senate Finance Committee, which is also consider-
ing its own trade bill, voted 9 to 3 on October 13 to approve in-
clusion of similar oil import quota restrictions. Since the Senate
version has welfare riders attached which may render it veto-
proof, 2° the controversy of tariffs v. quotas may become moot.
Several Senators have indicated displeasure with and an intent to
focus attention on the President's decision to ignore his Task
Force's recommendations.' The Senate debate on the Trade Bill
promises to be lively.
In retrospect and in summary, "[t~he question of a quota or a
tariff, however, is only a surface issue. The real issue is whether or
not to allow more foreign oil into the United States.""' Whether
11 Supra note 112. On Nov. 11, 1970, Gulf Oil Corp. posted an increase in crude
oil prices of $.25 per barrel, thus raising their well-head price from $3.10 to $3.35.
The next day Atlantic-Richfield followed suit. The administration announced, on
Nov. 13, a "major investigation" into these increases. The power of the Executive
Branch to inquire into this area derives from Section 6 (a) of Proclam. 3279, supra note
17, which states:
In the event prices of crude oil or its products or derivatives should be in-
creased . . . such surveillance shall include a determination as to whether
such . . . increases are necessary to accomplish the national security objectives
of ... this proclamation.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1970, at 1, col. 8 and at 60, col. 7.
116 Supra note 113.
117 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1970, at 60, col. 6.
118 H.R. 18970, the Trade Act of 1970, reached the House floor for vote in Nov.,
1970. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
119 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1970, at 57, col. 6. An editorial, appearing in the N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1970, at 34, col. 1, calls the Trade Act of 1970 a "thoroughly bad bill,"
which, by imposing quotas on a variety of imports "would put this country in flagrant
violation of the GATT rule . . . and would invite - virtually compel - retaliation."
120 Id.
121 N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1970, at 53, col. 3; at 58, col. 4.
122 Smith, Oil Imports and Security: Will Nixon's Backing the Quota System
Against a Tariff End the Arguments?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1970, at 45, col. 7.
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one subscribes to the national security rationale to justify the Oil
Program seems to be as much a matter of faith as of documentation.
In this instance the argument has carried the day and in the confu-
sion and hyper-reaction, the American consumer may have lost an-
other round to the oil industry.
VILMA L. KOHN
APPENDIX
Map reprinted from TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
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